COUNTRY SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT "Qnrmy from tho Depth of the Country in the Initial Period ofWar", or-General P. Stepehin
OF INFO1
OF CONTENT
SOURCE
A reliable source
erbatl" translation of anombined-Arms Army fro-
WSJ" h<iod SJ .
War , by Major-Ceneral P. Stepahin. This article
1ecial version"iUtary Thought which is
RETi- Published ir-
Issu* 6) was aeBt to pressrnThought" is published by
has been Isaued monthlyhile the other two The TOP SECRET veraion
ythc en<i. 6i
had been published.f them during
-1-
1
need o
go
the operating fronts with troops being moved up from depth hot only individual units and large units, but also whole formations, will be moved up to the line of the front. The demand.for this may result fromo create strong groupings in short periods ofevelop an'offensive, to deliver counterstrikes or to
hive t0apB2rePlace troops who have been weakened
or who have lost their combat effectiveness.
In recent years considerable experience hasfrom exercises in the organizationout of regroupingsombined-armsountry in the Initial periodar, ! !L ilitary operations and in t&fi_ex_ercises in the North
combined-arms.four
mlnthe
tolpartic.ipate in thent "of "
ront.st tacElnzouotalh"theater
ittl?Kg !De raIlroad and tnree highway axes. arge part of the troops (up toercent) moved under their own power, and the remainder by railroad, air, and water
va2horI10fn;battli_onday
ti- 'nother fwreise, an army with the same complementthe same assignmentm
v? hroad netVork and was sentattle io five days. Aboutercent of the complement /
-2-
of the army moved by railroad, up toercent moved under their own power, and aboutexgent of the whole volume of transportation fell to the lot of jalr transport"
The procedure and time for moving troops within the complement of an arrayegrouping can bo most varied. Together with this, an analysis of the experience of exercises and gamesumber of general laws characterizing the conditions and methods of organizing and conducting the regroupingombined-arms army from the depth of the country in the initial perioduclear/war.
The .lawVof nuclear/missile warfare, formulated by I '^hchev. which states that from the very beginning ttfTOraea conflict the primary efforts of both sides are aimed at the depth of the hostile camp, is bringing about basic changes ln the conditions for moving troops and willew character to regroupings.
Troops and communications will now be subjected to enemy action at any distance from the front. The scale and effectiveness of this action have increased It is sufficient to note that the probable enemy can take spe^laX-Boasures. at__the_beginning of aw'ar t6 upset the movement of reserves forward from the dipth ofseizing up so-called "nuclearcers^ along the .natural lines intersecting the basic^Simultaneously,arge number of-nuclear strllces_can"Se delivered against troops, road junctions, stations, tunnels, ports, and wharves. "
Judging by the exercises held, for struggle against reserves moving up in the most important theaters of
military operations.of nuclear warheads, of thousands
of bacterial, and ^oxic .chemicalfpoclally trained and equipped sabotage groups and detachments. This is'also taken into consideration inommand "games and operational exercises
-3-
F
Thus, during one ol the military command games, during the first two days of the war alone, the "enemy" deliveredroundir nuclear strikes against the lines of communication of our troops. Calculations showed that even such relatively small action by the "enemy" resulted in the radioactive contamination of large areas. Moreover,esult of the nuclearailroad junctions, whose restorationoays, were destroyed. The railroad network was broken upsolated sections. Of two through railroad lines leading toward tho front, one was put out of actionrolonged period, and the other was subjected to constant action by "enemy" sabotage groups and detachmentst The total carrying capacity of the railroads decreased bjr_nd the length of the route for the greater part of the military echelons increased twofold and more. As the result of the destructionydrotechnicalerrain over an areaym was flooded* Very Important highway junctions were also destroyed, and the roads themselves became clogged with streams of people civilian transportation.
a short time the forces and weapons of tho army had to be brought in to ensure the continuation of its regrouping, which was incarry out engineer work to overcome the obstacles which had appeared and to restore the roads, to carry out antiair defense and protection against atomic and chemical attack, to eliminate the consequences of the "enemy" nuclear attack, to increase sharply the commandant's service and the regulation of traffic, to destroy "enemy" sabotage groups and landings, and also totruggle against isolated groupings of his troops which remained in the rear of the attacking front in the zone near the border-Further "enemy" action against lines of communication and against troops moving up turned out to be so effective that it threatened the regrouping with possible failure. Special measures had to be taken to provide reliable support for the troops moving up.
The need for fire support of the regrouping was already felt during the past war. However, at that time, it amounted
-4-
to passive measures, mainly to the antiair defense of troops and lines of communication. Now this is no longer sufficient To ensure the movement of large reserves from the zone of Interior perational nuclear/missile means
jigainsi his airfields. This"combat will belied in theeJJeia-irpKn-bf.tfib General Headquarters oTWgupreme^gft_Cpmmand_forgainrng"ofVwat At" the same time, the planning and carrying out of the fire support or troops moving up must become an important dutyront and even for an army.
Consequently, the regrouping of an army from
rear to- the frontomething which formerly had the nature of "peacetime transportation" and which was frequently connected only with the expenditure of time vehicle resources, and fuelhas now been transformed istinctive combat operation whose purpose, after ctive and constant enemy counteraction has been overcome
1!Vk ffi"tain tne comt>at effectiveness of the troops andp the complement of the front to the grouping necessary for the performance of the new task. egrouping, the troops will now cease to be simply passengers being transported from one area to another. They will be forced to overcome various obstacles along the paths of their movement and to cross contaminated sectors of terrain, to take active measures to upset or to decrease enemy pressureaximum, and, in severalllminate the consequences of his nuclear
^groupingombat operationufficiently fully the qualitative change which it has undergone in connection with the shift in the center
reflectst0 the depth of tne belligerents
reflects the essence of the process of moving troops under
modern conditions, and favors the correct solutionrouping probleras connected with the organization of re-
9
The different methods in which it can be carried out are also in keeping with the changed nature of regrouping.
pontic;
Methods of moving troops which are not"connected with the use of the large, permanent transportation installations most subject to enemy action and which ensure reliable regrouping and maintenance of the combat effectiveness of the troops, are acquiring very great significance. Among these are the following: moving an armyhole by ftlr transppxtAllpn, with the loading and unloading of troops and equipment at temporary field airfields, combined regrouping*with the comprehensive use of various types of transportation, with the predominant role given to movement under their own power, and the movement of all the forces
own power. ve believe thaPtTie
=.eTFio3 WTlT Secome the most widespread lnYegrouplngsistance of^Up TOOlTSTTTerr ih the'zSrTrJr^^
Under modern conditions it is necessary to examine afresh the regrouping of an army, in connection with its subsequent commitment to battle. In the past, the sequence and procedure for rogrouping had little dependence on the nature of the operational task which the army had to accomplish within the complementront. In the majority of cases, after its movement an armyrolonged time in the build-up area, where it also prepared to conduct the operation.
At the present time, the high speeds of development of operations, the desire to increase its efforts as quickly as possible and to achieve surprise, the mass destruction of communications, and also the threat of the destructiononcentrated army by enemy nuclear/missile strikes, make it inadvisable for the army to remainuild-up areaong time, except in certain cases when it is necessary toew grouping of troops, for example, inounteroffensivelven axis .
The experience of exercises showsendency to transform the regrouping and the, comraitment to battle of an army.from two independent and relatively unrelated actsingle process, connectedeneral plan.
-6
and by the continuity of operations IS already appearing. There is every reason to suppose that, as the speed of regroupings and of the operations of ground troops increases, this law will manifest itself even more strongly* This results froa the fact that the organization and procedure for regrouping prove to depend increasingly on the nature of the operational task which the army will have to accomplish within the complementront. However, for the proper organization of troop movement, there is more and more need for timely determination and knowledge of this task.
It is sometimes said that in the strained and dynamic situation of the initial periodar, it will be impossible to determine in advance the nature of the task which an army will accomplish after regrouping within the complementront. Of course, sudden and abrupt changes in the situation during this time are quite possible. On this basis, however, it is impossible to gainsay the advisability of planning the first army operations and army regroupings from the depth of the country before the war starts.
It should be borne in mind that under modern conditions in contrast to the last war, the number of armies withinmplgm,entront may be somewhat smaller. In connection with this, there is the increasing possibility of determining the tasks of each army in good time. Moreover, in the majority of cases the development of an offensive by the troopsront will be carried out, we suppose, by the reinforcement of the armies of the first echelon with individual large units from the front's reserve, The commitment hole army to battle must beare"phenomenon, and the general nature tiT"the" task of such an army can be determined in advance.
For example, in one of the exercises, the need to commit an army to battle arose from the factew, important operational axis had appeared in the depth of "enemy" territory. In another instance, an army was committed to battle after troops of thechelon of the front hadarrow.defile between two water barriers. In both instances, the operational tasks of the armies being committed in the impending army Dperatlons were determined in advance.
1
jjJNP.Ah'K'
Sometimes it will be possible to orient an array in the most probable variants of its use in general terms only, but even this will assist in the purposeful organization of troop movement.
Depending on the length of the period of threat
(ugrozhayemyyhe periods of mobilization the
complement and assignment of the army, and the distance
and speed of the regrouping, an army can arrive in the
complement of the front at various stages of its first or
subsequent operations, and, if the period of threat is of
sufficient duration, before the beginning of military
operations and at the beginning of the war it will be in
the first echelon, or will comprise the second echelon of the front.
An army which lg_eployedistance =from .the .line of The' (front, and which succeeds in completing its mobilization BeToPe the beginning of military operations or which Is
i the first front operation, isonfi-*th to seventht,he_.war_.
Spst .probable that mobilization will begin only on the. ovc^and sometimes at tho beginning, of the war. In rwiscase, an array which "is' moving forward wKile regr^upTngm will be able to
the. second and subsequent operations'ront. Guaranteeing the participation of this army in the first front operationery complicated task which can be accomplished only by moving the troops by
nave"Hilary transport aircraft as thend theelicopter, which are able to transport by air the personnel and organic meansotorized rifle division of modem organization
(without rankcl
-8-
Calculations showllitarv transporr aviationifle division ip_two,trigs_oyerj distancem in two .days- Fro. this, oneaiaTTitary transport means already Beet requirements for the movement of troops over large distances. When this aviation is equipped withircraft, it will be able to tr.n'spSrt motorized rifle and tank divisions and missile and other units in full complement by air.
However, this does not exclude the need for the further improvement of military transport aviation For example, we must have aircraft able to carry loads of 30
a BttX,BUB sPeed ofph, and
ange otocan take
off and land on dirt airfields of limited size. There isreat future for autocraftombining the characteristicselicopter and an automobile and anie to move on the ground as well as in the air.
An important problem is that of decreasing the time between regrouping and committing an army to combat As has already been noted, the simultaneous commitment of all
ud SiltCeS of an anav whlch iBup will nowery rare phenomenon. There is now no
nof anefinite
areas until they have been fully concentrated. Firstlyrouping wouldood target for enemy nuclear strikes and could cause great losses; secondly the presence.of an army in the build-up area for several days will result in its separation from the troops operating
C thiS WlUtheof the first ochelon
As has been shown by the experience ofone or two divisions which are in contact withJ US^allvln "bordinated to anf It batUT aft'r "souping, and at first, of arriving troops may be committed
to battlea missile brigade and -three, two, or even one division with the necessary means for reinforcementole, these divi.lons will be committed to battle on separate axes andifferent depth as they approach
-9-
mod deploy for
Therefore, under the conditions which have been examined, the readiness of an army for commitment to battle must be determined not by the completion of the concentration of all its forces, but by the time ol! the arrival in the new areas of its large units which have been assigned for operations in the first echelon of the army. On exercises this made It possible for us to reduce the time between the beginning of regrouping and the commitment of an army to battle by almost three days.
In connection with the conceptions which have been expressed, the procedure for assigning the task ofto an army is also changing. For example, in the majority of instances the designationuild-up area Is losing its meaning because in practice there will be no auch build-up; the large units of the first echelon of the army will enter battle abruptly, while the remainder, trying not to lag behind the troops operating ahead, will also continue the movement, in readiness to develop the
It seems to us that, under the conditions which have been examined, instead of indicating an areaime for the conclusion of the build-up of an army, it would be preferable to specify the area and time at which commitment to battle should be begun and ended and also the forces by which this commitment should be carried out and supported.
Also, in allotting tasks to the army's large units, there is no need to specify build-up areas. Bearing in mind that these large units will enter combat abruptly, and frequently not simultaneously, they should be given only the limits of deployment (commitment).
Allocation of tasks in this way corresponds more fully to the modern understanding of commitment to battle and to its coordination with regrouping, irllows maximum use of the limited capabilities of existing means of communication* for the forward movement of large units in
the most advisable sequence, and reduces the tlmc*needed o move and create the necessary grouping of forces and
h * *
Prgparatlon for moving an anny from the depth of the
before war starts. In this process,
Its assignment and complement-"together with the zone of Its movement, the times for mobilizing and regrouping, the requisite transport and support means, and the procedure for their use. At the same time, measures are taken to maintain the constant high state of mobilization and march readiness of the troops. In accordance with the assignment of tbe army and with possible changes in the state of the lines of communication and transportation, several variants of the regrouping plan are worked out.
Under the conditions of nuclear/missile warfare, however, the significance of this prewar planning should not be exaggerated. The experience of exercises shows that the very first enemy nuclear/missile strikes can soalter the periods for mobilising troops, the state of the lines of communication, and their traffic capacity, that only basic elements of the prewar plan will retain their significance. Therefore, the greater part of tho work on the organization of the forward movement win be done not ahead of time but immediately before the very beginning of regrouping, in extremely compressed periods of time, often under enemy action, while the consequences of his strikes are being'eliminated, and simultaneously with the conduct of mobilization measures.
So that the army commander and staff will be able to accomplish their tasks successfully under these complicated conditions, we must first of all ensure the rapid collection of information on the situation* For this,ingle system must be worked out for notifying troops about the radiation situation, using all the means of reconnaissance, subunits and units of the cjhemical troops, local organs of civil defense, and .the network of the hydro-meteorological service. We must also resolve the
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: